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1SGP
"Rules matter." Inman (1996)
"We must constantly re-examine our rules and be prepared to question every
single one of them" Von Hayek (1979)
1 Introduction
Taken together these two quotes sum up this paper. Inman believes that rules matter,
in the sense that if there is a rule in place then we are more likely to take notice of this
fact and alter or at least marginally modify our behaviour ￿but the form and content
of the rule also matters too, and so rules must be appropriate for the circumstance in
question. There is also a sociological and psychological context to rules as well: if it
becomes accepted behaviour to break a rule, then although not everyone will break the
rule, there will be a certain (perhaps time-varying) proportion of the population who will.
Clearly as circumstances change, our rules should change to match those circumstances,
and if we want them to apply to all circumstances then they have to be general and ￿ exible
enough to encompass all circumstances. For if rules don￿ t appear to be useful, then they
lose their meaning and should be scrapped or changed so that they are useful.
In this paper the Stability and Growth pact (SGP) of the European Union (EU) is
treated as a collection of procedures and rules which determine the monitoring of and
the limits for member state ￿scal policy within the context of European Monetary Union
(EMU). On one level the SGP is clearly a set of procedures for monitoring ￿scal policies
of member states so that coordination can take place in the context of the economic inter-
dependencies within EMU, but on another level the pact contains explicit rules governing
limits for the outcome of macroeconomic policy to more clearly de￿ne the excessive de￿cit
procedure contained in the Maastricht Treaty (of the European Communities (1992)) which
was part of a set of criteria to foster economic convergence before EMU. Although the pact
was not formally included into the Treaty (see Crowley (2002c)), it still forms the basis
for ￿scal policy coordination in the EU, in the sense that it provides the link between a
decentralized ￿scal policy and a centralized monetary policy (see Feldstein (2005)), and
most politicians now interpret as being inextricably linked to the Maastricht Treaty, so it
is desirable to obtain unanimity for any substantive changes to the pact1.
The Stability and Growth pact was meant to partially counterbalance this EU ￿scal
policy vacuum by introducing a degree of implicit but coerced coordination among EU
1As the pact itself is not included in the Treaty, it can be changed with a simple quali￿ed majority vote.
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EMU member states. It does not apply directly to non-EMU EU member states, although
these member states are included in the surveillance part of the pact as their ￿scal stances
can obviously impact the pan-EU economic situation. When the SGP was ￿rst introduced
in 1996 it was quite controversial, as at that time there was some speculation as to which
member states would qualify to proceed to the next stage of EMU. Theo Waigel, then
Finance Minister for Germany, ￿rst proposed various ￿scal codes to ensure ￿scal stability in
EMU in mid-19962. The fear voiced in the popular German media was that highly-indebted
member states would join EMU and then destabilize the project if there were no ￿scal
restraints in place. Many political commentators also recognized that domestic political
factors in Germany were also at play: Germans were, by quite a substantial majority, not
in favour of eliminating the German mark for the euro, and so the SGP was proposed as a
way to placate German fears about EMU. The pact was originally proposed as a ￿stability￿
pact, but after the need for such a pact had been agreed upon, the French objected to
the overt emphasis on ￿scal stability when French unemployment levels suggested a large
output gap, so to allay French concerns about ensuring growth, clauses that dealt with
the ￿exceptional￿circumstances of recession were clari￿ed, the word ￿growth￿was inserted
into the pact title, and a largely symbolic political declaration was made on creating more
employment and growth in the EU.
The SGP did not attract any attention for its ￿rst few years in operation, and indeed,
because of strong economic growth and the political focus on the successful completion of
EMU and establishment of the ECB, there was little in the way of any academic work done
on the SGP in either the economics or political science ￿elds during this time. This has all
changed in the last 2 years as ￿scal policy in EMU has become an extremely controversial
topic, with France and Germany being issued automatic warnings by the Commission, and
the acrimonious environment in which the decision by both these countries to ignore these
warnings was taken in early 2004. Indeed, both countries, plus Italy and Greece exceeded
the SGP guidelines in 2004, which prompted legal manoeuvres by the Commission to try
and retain some vestiges of credibility for the pact. While EU member states appear to
accept that some form of ￿scal pact is needed3, the current form of the pact is viewed as
too restictive in present circumstances (a low-in￿ ation, low-growth environment). As the
2Waigel initially proposed a medium-term target for government de￿cits of 1% of GDP, with automatic
sanctions if there was an excessive de￿cits and a ￿stability council￿as a decision making body.
3Former Commission President Romano Prodi though, acknowledged the weaknesses of the pact, and
went as far as to call the SGP ￿stupid￿in an interview with Le Monde (October 17th, 2002), a view held
by many of the larger member states.
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Commission￿ s review of the SGP is now complete, agreement appears to have been reached
to delay any ￿nes or actions on the part of the Commission for 5 years from the declaration
of an "excessive de￿cit" and inclusion of a longer list of "exceptional circumstances" that
would justify de￿cits "slightly and temporarily" above 3 percent of GDP. As of writing, if
agreement to modify the SGP is not reached, then, in e⁄ect, the coercive elements of the
pact (which were e⁄ectively suspended in early 2004) will likely continue to be ignored for
the forseeable future.
The motivations for this paper are three-fold. First, the question ￿what is the purpose
of the SGP?￿needs to be addressed. This is an important question, as it purpose and
functional design are clearly inter-related. Second, given the controversy over the SGP,
there have been several suggestions made by economists on how to reform the SGP so these
suggestions (for improvement) need to be reviewed in light of the current design of the
pact. Third, and perhaps most importantly, additional alternatives to the current o⁄erings
in the literature for improvement of the SGP are o⁄ered and appraised alongside other
suggestions from academics. The paper proceeds by brie￿ y describing what the SGP is in
section 2. Section 3 then o⁄ers a framework for analysis based on existing economics and
psychology literature, and section 4 then extends this analysis into the political economy
domain. Section 5 looks at modi￿cations and alternatives to the pact, and section 6 then
concludes.
2 What is the SGP?
2.1 The workings of the SGP
The SGP itself consists of 3 components:
i) 2 European Council regulations (1466 and 1467/97);
ii) a resolution/directive (17/6/97, #26); and
iii) an opinion of the monetary committee (￿Opinion on the content and format of sta-
bility and convergence programmes￿ , 12 October, 1998, revised July 10, 2001).
The pact itself is essentially the two Council regulations, with the resolution as a con￿r-
matory measure and the opinion as a clari￿cation for purposes of implementation. The ￿rst
Council regulation (1466/97), originally proposed in Dublin in December 1996, strength-
ens the surveillance and monitoring of ￿scal stance based on Article 99 of the Treaty on
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Union (originally Maastricht which has now been succeeded by Amsterdam). The stability
programmes have to contain a medium-term objective for ￿scal policy with the budgetary
position close to balance or in surplus, the dynamic towards this goal and the assumptions
in the programme, and measures proposed to achieve the goal and a sensitivity analysis.
The programmes are public, and are updated annually. The Council monitors the imple-
mentation of the programmes, and if a signi￿cant divergence is detected, an ￿early warning￿
can be issued to a member state, in the form of a recommendation under Article 99(4) of
the Treaty. In essence, then, this is the preventative part of the SGP.
The second Council regulation (1467/97) speeds up and clari￿es the excessive de￿cit
procedure from the Treaty. The pact adds de￿nition to terms such as ￿exceptional and
temporary￿and speci￿es the timeline for the original excessive de￿cit procedure from the
Maastricht Treaty. It also implements a system of non-interest bearing deposits for trans-
gression of the guidelines or non-implementation of EU recommendations and the possibility
of converting these deposits into ￿nes if satisfactory action is not taken after two years. This
represents the coercive part of the SGP.
A resolution was then made at the Amsterdam European Council meeting which al-
though not legally binding, essentially invited all participants to abide by the Treaty and
the Stability and Growth pact in a strict and timely manner. The resolution referred to the
Council regulations ￿as a rule￿ , because an automatic procedure was ruled out as it would
go beyond the terms of the original Maastricht Treaty. It is somewhat strange then that
the regulation 1467/97 has an exhaustive list of situations in which the excessive de￿cit
procedure is to be held in abeyance and, as noted by the European Court of Justice4, the
decisions of the Council in regard to the operation of the SGP are "intended to have legal
e⁄ects". Hence the interpretation that the resolution was largely politcally motivated.
The last component of the pact consists of an opinion given by the Monetary Committee
during 1998, endorsed by Eco￿n in October of the same year and then updated as part of
a code of conduct in 2001. The opinion essentially gave the ￿medium term￿adjustment to
budgetary positions close to balance or in surplus a timeline, and also that the assessment of
completion of the adjustment should take into account the business cycle and therefore the
cyclically-adjusted (or structural) budgetary position. This cyclically-adjusted budgetary
position is certainly used more prominently in the assessment than it has been since the
2001 revision (see Commission (2002)).
4ECJ Press Release No 57/04 on Case C-27/04.
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In terms of the process of the SGP, it is the Commission that makes recommendations to
the Council on the basis of whether either actual or planned government de￿cits exceed the
reference value of 3% of GDP, given that the surveillance has taken place as per 1466/97.
Once a recommendation is made, the Council votes by quali￿ed majority on whether an
excessive de￿cit exists, although the member state is only put into an "excessive de￿cit"
position when the actual data are published. If the Council deems that an excessive de￿cit
does indeed exist or is likely to do so, it must also adopt a recommendation to the member
state in question as to how to correct the situation. The recommendation must contain a
four month deadline which is the length of time allowed for the member state to take action,
and a further deadline which speci￿es that the correction should be made in the following
year. The most important feature here is the four-month deadline, as economic circum-
stances can adversely a⁄ect the outcome, in which case as long as action has been taken by
the member state concerned, the procedure iterates back to the recommendation stage by
the Commission. If, however, the member state does not respond to the recommendation,
then the timetable for sanctions and ￿nes begins.
2.2 The economics of the SGP
The Maastricht Treaty economic convergence criteria were originally proposed in a paper
by Lamfalussy (1989) and were taken up by the Delors Committee as a way of ensur-
ing economic convergence before EMU was launched. Much ink has been spilled over the
Maastricht Treaty convergence criteria ( - for example see Fratianni, Von Hagen, and Waller
(1992) Buiter, Corsetti, and Roubini (1993), Eichengreen (1993) and Crowley (1996), to
name a few), and there was little consensus in the economics profession as to the desir-
ability of these criteria for EMU membership ( - particularly the ￿scal and ERM criteria).
The agreement in Dublin, Ireland, for post-1999 conditions for continuing membership of
EMU which essentially de￿nes the SGP (of the European Communities (1996) and of the
European Communities (1997)), e⁄ectively entrenched the budget de￿cit criteria for the
foreseeable future to act as a quasi-condition for continuing member-in-good-standing of
EMU.
As emphasized in Hagen (2002) and Crowley (2002b), the 3 percent de￿cit rule, as
incorporated into the Maastricht convergence criteria, possessed both an incentive and a
penalty instrument - the incentive instrument was being in the ￿rst wave of EMU and
the penalty instrument was not being a member of EMU right from the start, when the
framework for EU monetary policy was determined. Many economists have mused as to
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why the debt criterion was not also explicitly part of the SGP. This is because politically the
debt criteria had to be ￿soft￿in terms of the entry criteria to EMU, otherwise countries like
Belgium and Italy would not qualify for membership - in other words it was modi￿ed in the
Maastricht Treaty to ensure that even temporary movements in gross public debt towards
the 60 percent level would satisfy the criteria. But this "softening" of the Maastricht
convergence criteria led to the focus in the SGP being on budget de￿cits rather than gross
public debt.
Turning to the SGP itself, the design of the SGP features benchmarks but only penalties
for not obeying the pact. The SGP therefore substitutes the penalty of not taking part
in EMU which was the hallmark of the Maastricht Treaty with a potentially large penalty
instrument, but the direct bene￿ts of complying are no longer there - i.e. there is no positive
incentive mechanism. From a domestic political perspective, politicians have an incentive to
keep the general public as content as possible so as to increase re-election probability, while
at the same time imposing the lowest possible level of taxes on the population, implying
that budget de￿cits should rise before in an election year or the previous year. The other
part of the pact does require that member states keep a budget balance or surplus in
unexceptional times - but there are no bene￿ts for doing this or penalties for not doing
this, so the compliance incentives are minimal5. Thus, from an economic standpoint, the
lack of a strong incentive mechanism means that politicians, besides that of providing as
much public expenditure as needed to get re-elected up to where the penalty kicks in,
have an optimal strategy of running surpluses or small de￿cits in non-election years, with
incentives to increase expenditures so that the de￿cit comes in at around 2.9 percent of
GDP in an election year!6
Given the origins of the numbers in the pact what was the rationale for an SGP from
an economic behaviour point of view? These reasons are well documented in the literature
so are presented in the form of table 1 below.
5In fact, it clearly depends on an assessment by the party in power as to whether the next election or
the next economic downturn occurs ￿rst. If the economic downturn occurs ￿rst, then presumably there
is an incentive to try to balance the budget now so as not to have to ￿scally retrench during an election
campaign. On the other hand if the election is forecast to come before the next economic downturn, then
clearly there is no incentive to achieve ￿medium term￿balance
6Strauch and Von Hagen (2001) and Hughes Hallett, Lewis, and Von Hagen (2003) show empirically
that the SGP has not stopped governments from using ￿scal policies to pursue electoral interests. Ob-
viously exceeding the 3% level might prove unpopular with the electorate, as it would not demonstrate
￿scal responsibility, or perversely, it could prove politically popular, as a way of demonstrating national
sovereignty by ￿ outing Brussels.
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Several points arise from table 1. First, none of the solution designs match the original
design of the SGP, even in combination. All the explanations for the pact have been
cited as possible reasons why a ￿scal pact is necessary, although some of these explanations
perhaps have greater strength with politicians than others. Explanations iii), iv) and
vi) are most cited by politicians and the European Commission as the rationale for the
pact, political scientists appear to focus on explanations i), ii) and iv) as the reason why
the pact was originally introduced by Germany, and economists usually cite explanations
v), vi) and vii) as to why a pact is desirable. Terminating "end games" was likely the
original motivation, so as to give ￿scally pro￿ igate countries second thoughts about entering
EMU, as in hindsight it is di¢ cult to imagine Germany proposing a similar pact under
current circumstances. Supranational ￿scal coordination would certainly be enhanced by
the preventative part of the SGP, and does apply elsewhere (Australia). The enhancement
of ECB reputation would also imply a limited-period pact which could be annulled once the
ECB felt that policy coordination and ￿scal rectitude were a thing of the past. More than
likely, a multi-faceted set of economic reasons mediated through a political process resulted
in the current pact, as other member states were clearly convinced that such a pact was
necessary for EMU to be successful.
Second, the main economic explanations for the pact, entries v), vi) and vii) imply a
solution design that uses public debt as the appropriate variable, not budget de￿cits. One
of the themes of this paper is that a continuation of the bad economics and politics of least
resistance which characterised Maastricht were used to construct the SGP, but unlike the
Maastricht criteria where these were only applied instantaneously, the SGP has become a
permanent feature of EMU.
The initial concerns that Germany voiced for needing a pact appear to have metamor-
phosed into mostly ECB concerns that more heavily-indebted EU member states might
cause higher pan-EU interest rates through their ￿scal policies. As Hagen (2002) sug-
gests, once in a monetary union though, highly-indebted small member states really do not
impact the monetary policy of the monetary union (as their debts are still small in com-
parison with EU GDP), so that only larger highly-indebted member states could possibly
cause such spillover e⁄ects.
Patrick M. Crowley Page: 9SGP
3 Framework for Analysis of Rules
3.1 Rules and Individual Behavior
In everyday life we live by rules - rules relating to such mundane things as tra¢ c, taxes,
modes of social behavior, and on a more personal level rules which dictate our interactions
with others, such as social etiquette, relationships and marriage. These rules get broken by
some people and others stick to them religiously, depending on their desirability, societal
context and how others behave with respect to these rules. Some rules are enforced by law,
some are more social conventions perhaps backed up by laws that are rarely enforced, and
others are perhaps best viewed as social norms that are not enforced by law but are rarely
transgressed. Of course, depending on culture, rules and laws can be blatantly ignored
by citizens, despite the fact that there may be heavy ￿nes and penalties associated with
transgression. In most European cultures, though, rules are usually taken quite seriously,
so widespread ￿ outing of rules is not usually an issue7.
As the SGP is basically a rule-based coordination mechanism, an inter-disciplinary
approach to rules might be able to help shed some light about if, when, and how such
rules should be devised, and when they might be breached (see Greenburg (1990) for a
game theoretic approach to some of the material discussed below and see Pettit (2002)
for an overview of the philosophical and psychological context in which the study of rules
and norms occurs, and the issues therein). It is important here ￿rst to distinguish social
norms from rules. Social norms are dictated by "expected" social behaviour, and as such
can often be culturally acquired. According to psychologists, norms are both descriptive
(what people do in certain situations) and prescriptive (what people should do in a speci￿c
situation) in that they characterize behaviour or what behaviour ought to be (presumably
in the opinion of the ruling majority)8 . Rules, on the other hand, are usually backed up
or dictated by law. Rules may have been acquired by social convention, but as they are
rules they either embed social norms into a legal framework or dictate rules that govern
how society should operate in relation to a speci￿c situation or issue ( - sometimes in cases
where there have been no social norms to appeal to ￿e.g. euthanasia). For example greeting
others in various social situations is usually culturally embedded and is learned through
7Of course this is not true of many developing or transition economies, where tax avoidance and bribery
are commonplace.
8An example of a descriptive norm is "pedestrians wait until the lights are green before crossing the
road" and an example of a prescriptive norm is "pedestrians should wait until the lights are green before
crossing the road".
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schooling and through various other social interactions with others and as such these norms
vary from place to place9. Thus when rules which embed social norms are enforced by law,
these laws can di⁄er substantially from place to place according to what has been accepted
as appropriate behavior in those places - rules might be seen as legitimating those norms,
and as a way of enforcing those norms as the view of the majority. Driving is a good
example of this. Learning to drive implies knowing a set of rules as to how to interpret
signs and appropriate behavior in various situations involving other automobiles. Rules
and ways in which tra¢ c is manipulated though can vary from country to country - not
only on which side of the road vehicles drive, but also how vehicles negotiate particular
circumstances10.
The study of rules and when we need them crosses over into the realms of philosophy (see
Goldman (2002)), but here we can abstract to the socio-economic function of rules, as this
most closely relates to the justi￿cation for the SGP from a political-economy perspective.
From this perspective then, why are rules necessary and why are social norms insu¢ cient?
One could argue that there are three reasons for rules over and above social norms ￿the ￿rst
being a problem of coordination of social norms when numbers become large, the second
being that of externalities which in certain circumstances dictate that rules are less socially
costly and third, a free rider problem.
The coordination problem arises because the costs of obeying social norms can more
than outweigh the enforcement costs of legalizing those norms (see Collett (1977)). An
example here in terms of tra¢ c rules might be the e¢ ciency of four-way stops versus tra¢ c
lights at the same junction. Four-way stops often are more costly in terms of time taken
to negotiate, and it is often a matter of judgement as to who has the right of way at such
junctions. This is not a great issue if there are few lanes approaching the junction so that
the social norm can easily be interpreted and implemented. But if there are eight lanes
approaching a junction, then who has the right of way becomes more di¢ cult to establish,
and the coordination problem of who goes ￿rst becomes a major obstacle to negotiating
the junction safely. Hence on busy or complex junctions, tra¢ c lights enforce the right of
way, giving a safer and on average a quicker passage through the junction ￿in other words,
9For example, there are various accepted "greeting norms" even in Western countries, such as shaking
hands or hugging in the UK, kissing one cheek in France, kissing on two cheeks in Quebec and kissing on
three cheeks in the Netherlands.
10For example in the UK, "roundabouts" are usually governed by a yield principle ( - vehicles yield to
others already on a roundabout, and wait for a gap in order to get into the tra¢ c stream), where as in
Canada the interweaving principle is used ( - one vehicle goes round, and one vehicle enters the "rotary").
In other words the situation is the same, but the rule is di⁄erent.
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the tra¢ c lights solve the communication problem.
Second is the problem of externalities. From a legal perspective, we need rules as a way
of protecting others if there is an incentive to behave di⁄erently from what should be the
social norm. River ￿shing or ￿shing treaties between nations might be good examples here,
as over-￿shing a river or marine environment can bene￿t the ￿sher who does the ￿shing,
but leaves others with much less ￿sh. From an economic perspective we can think of rules
ensuring or protecting the common social good particularly if the private net bene￿t exceeds
the social net bene￿t because of the existence of externalities.
Third, we also have rules when there is a potential free-rider problem. A good example
here might be taxes. Rules are made so that costs are imposed on people who cheat with
their taxes, as there are immediate ￿nancial bene￿ts from not revealing income so as to
lower tax payments (or obtain a higher tax rebate), with clear social costs as taxes fund
public expenditures. Here, through the state, social values determine both the amount of
the taxes and the bene￿ts derived from these taxes, but also the penalties for free-riding if
income is not revealed.
What are the characteristics of these three types of rules in terms of enforcement,
incentives, and ￿nes? In the ￿rst case (rules that internalize communication problems)
enforcement tends to be relatively light and there is little need for incentives or large
penalties for breaking the rules, particularly if these rules embed social norms. In the second
case (externalities), there is usually much tighter enforcement (as in the case of hunting
permits, smoking laws and tra¢ c) particularly if there are powerful pressure groups which
can exert political in￿ uence, and so the penalties can potentially be much larger. In the
third and last case (free-rider problem), there is usually only light or mutual enforcement,
as this can add to social costs, but large ￿nes/costs if caught transgressing the rules (either
in terms of broken trust, or in terms of monetary penalties). In this last case ￿nes and
penalties are often heavy so as to set an example for others not to break these rules.
Given these rules, and the rationale given above for them, do we observe compliance, and
if so, when? Clearly individual decision-making determines when rules are broken, but the
strength of social norms and cultural factors can play a major role. Kenrick, Li, and Butner
(2003) looked at individual decision rules and how these rules impacted the emergence of
social behaviour and found that indeed the individual decision-making mechanisms and
group (societal) dynamics determine the outcome and the "sociospatial geometry".
Another closely-related question is "when is it acceptable to break these rules?" Obvi-
ously there are some individuals who do break the rules, and likewise there are companies
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and governments that also break rules. Verkuyten, Rood-Pijpers, El⁄ers, and Hessing
(1993) o⁄er an analysis of rules and rule-breaking behavior among individuals. In intro-
ducing their study, they state:
￿As Abel (1973) pointed out, this perspective of policymakers in essence is
grounded on a somewhat naive positivistic idea about what legal rules are and
how they operate in social life. A legal rule is seen as an order to be complied
with by everyone. To guarantee such compliance, tangible and immediate in-
centives and penalties are believed to be the most suitable instruments.￿(p486)
Put in other terms, just because a law is in place as a legal instrument doesn￿ t necessarily
mean that people will abide by it. Having incentives and penalties in place will better ensure
that the law becomes embedded in social behaviour. As further noted in Verkuyten,
Rood-Pijpers, El⁄ers, and Hessing (1993), in breaking rules such as running a red light
or ￿ling a falsi￿ed tax return the evidence points to acceptance by the majority of the
population for rule-breaking, but only in certain special circumstances. So for example
running a red light would be acceptable in the case of an emergency. Interestingly, 18%
of the respondents stated that it would be acceptable to ￿ll out tax forms dishonestly,
depending on the circumstances of the individual, and the amount of the deception. Given
individual preferences and the absence of information asymmetries, breaking rules is much
more likely when these rules are less strictly enforced, when the penalties are lower for
doing so, and when there are no long-term incentives in place for compliance.
Lastly, two further observations can be made here: ￿rst, when a rule is embedding an
already-existing social norm, incentives are less likely to be needed to ensure compliance -
penalties are only usually present to ensure that errant individuals are rare. Second, when a
rule is not embedding a social norm, it clearly helps if there are incentives to obey the rule,
and usually greater enforcement and penalties are needed to encourage socially optimal
behavior. Table 2 below summarizes the discourse above:
3.2 Rules and Governments
Given our analysis of rules pertaining to individuals above, we now turn to rules relating
to the conduct of governments. Most analyses of government and rules in the political
economy domain has focused on rules to limit the growth of government (see Von Hayek
(1973)). As it is rare that a supranational institution should attempt to enforce strict
economic rules governing the behavior of national governments, this requires a somewhat
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Type Enforcement Incentive to abide Fines
Coordination
based
Lax
Not usually relevant -
socially/culturally determined
Light
Externality
based
Strict - depending
on size of externality
High/low -
depending on the nature
of the externality
Usually heavy, but
depends on size
of the externality
Free rider
based
Lax - often trust/
altruistically based
Low
Heavy - usually as
a means of
"example setting"
Table 2: Rules: Penalties, Enforcement, Violation Acceptability
di⁄erent approach. So who imposes rules on governments, and what are the nature of these
rules? International law obviously is a set of pre-agreed rules relating to the behaviour
of states, and usually by Treaty. But one of the problems in international law has been
persuasion or enforcement as in many instances international institutions possess only weak
enforcement mechanisms. In the political arena, probably the most important international
body, the United Nations, has only resolutions as a way of condemning the actions of
individual members and the regular ￿ outing of these has had a weakening e⁄ect on the
credibility of the institution. The only time that rules can e⁄ectively be enforced is likely
in an armistice Treaty context where an enforcement mechanism can be applied through
continued occupation at the end of a war or the real threat of re-occupation after the end of
a war11. In the economic domain, there are perhaps four speci￿c examples of the imposition
of rules on governments or nation states that are worth mentioning:
i) the IMF, which imposes "conditionality" rules on economic policies of developing coun-
tries in return for loans and structural support;
ii) the WTO, which imposes sanctions on countries that break international trade rules,
although the imposition of these sanctions is usually levied indirectly by way of al-
lowing another member of the organization to impose tari⁄s or quotos on the exports
of the country to be penalized; and
iii) the self-imposition of rules by states which are then enforced by citizens or corporations
through litigation by individuals or other states in federal or supranational courts.
11Reparation payments by the axis powers after the First World War are a good example here, and most
economic historians acknowledge that the inability to repay such large amounts likely resulted not only in
the hyperin￿ ation episodes of the inter-war period, but also in the rise of extremist parties in Germany.
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Examples of the adjudication of these types of rules include the European Court of
Justice, the tribunal system of NAFTA, and balanced budget legistlation in individual
US states.
iv) the SGP
In terms of this list, the SGP clearly stands out as being di⁄erent from other types of
rules imposed on governments. The IMF polices countries by writing annual economic
reports and then imposes conditionality as the "stick" which yields the "carrot" of IMF
lending and then (increased) access to international capital markets. If the country re-
neges on a commitment to follow certain economic policies then further IMF funds are
often withheld or not as much will be forthcoming in following years. The WTO doesn￿ t
police individual countries and usually imposes penalties indirectly - so the incentive mech-
anism here is to follow international trade rules or another country will bring a case to the
WTO, and ultimately the imposition of the ￿ne is up to the prosecuting country, although
from an economics standpoint in welfare terms both countries are made worse o⁄ by its
imposition. Only in the third case above are sanctions directly and automatically imposed
on governments with a compulsion to pay, and these are only policed through individuals
or corporations bringing judicial cases against the countries or states concerned, and then
the ￿nes or other penalties are decided by the judicial system. Turning to the SGP, it
is immediately apparent that there is really no enforcement mechanism for dealing with
payments, plus it makes little sense to impose penalties or ￿nes on member states who
breach the SGP limits, as this only exacerbates the economic problem it is attempting to
solve.
In terms of the rationale for these rules or obligations, the IMF tries to give countries an
incentive to follow sound economic policies so that the population will have higher welfare
levels in the longer term12, thereby suggesting an externality-based reason for imposing
rules. Of course, and perhaps Argentina is the best example of this, the general population
could be myopic or perceive that the short run austerity might outweigh any longer term
gains. In the case of the WTO, the organization has as its general aims the maintenance
of freer world trade, so that if governments introduce policies that unfairly favour their
citizens or corporations, then a case can be brought against a country by another member
country - in this sense countries might be viewed as free-riding on the free trade system.
12In the short term, though, the IMF has been accused by many of imposing harsh economic conditions
which lowers the average level of welfare for the population as a whole.
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With international agreements or domestically imposed laws, the main incentive to break
these agreements can be either externalities13 or free-rider bene￿ts14.
The SGP clearly has elements of all three reasons for rules ￿￿rst there are possible co-
ordination problems both with the ECB and potentially between themselves given spillover
e⁄ects ￿but most of these are dealt with by the regulation 1466 and the "no bailout" clause
in Maastricht; second, there are potential externalities if one member state pursues ￿scal
policies that lead to higher interest rates elsewhere ; and third, so the argument goes, there
are free-rider problems in that with a common monetary policy, without ￿scal restraints
there is an incentive not to retrench if others do so, so that you can "experience the gain
without the pain". It would be di¢ cult to determine which of these is most important in
deciding to implement ￿scal rules at a pan-EU level, but table 2 suggests that if the reasons
for instituting rules for individuals were valid for the EU, then the coercive part of the SGP
is designed more with externalities and free-rider problems in mind, as there are both close
enforcement and large penalties.
Compliance is another issue with the SGP, but some recent academic work has focused
on member state compliance with EU directives/regulations. As Tallberg (2002) outlines,
there are two theoretical approaches that have been adopted, the ￿rst being an enforce-
ment approach, which stresses coercive strategies for compliance, and the second being a
management/problem-solving approach, which includes capacity-building and rule inter-
pretation. Tallberg claims that indeed this tendency to combine these two approaches has
made the EU remarkably successful in terms of member state compliance rates, reducing it
to largely a temporal problem On the other hand where only one of these approaches has
been used, high non-compliance rates have been a problem within the context of the EU15.
Ignoring the management/problem-solving elements of the pact - which roughly trans-
late into the monitoring mechanisms of regulation 1466/97, why the coercive element (the
excessive de￿cit procedure) then16? Presumably this was originally thought of as mainly an
13An example might be breaking a balanced budget law at a state level, which would clearly have debt
implications in the longer term, implying higher taxes for the electorate in the future - this is clearly an
externalities problem.
14An example might be breaking the Kyoto accord on environmental pollution reduction, which would
clearly be free-riding on what others have done to reduce environmental pollution.
15Some political scientists (see Neyer (2004)) have gone so far as to claim that the EU represents a new
type of political order in the sense that centralized coercion does not appear necessary in order to achieve
compliance with directives/regulations. Although this may be true in many policy areas, it clearly doesn￿ t
apply to the SGP.
16Paul De Grauwe perhaps has some of the strongest views on the pact, stating that "It is quite surprising
that EU countries have allowed this to happen, and that they have agreed to be subjected to control by
European institutions that even the IMF does not impose on banana republics" (Financial Times, July
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incentive mechanism that likely be a backup to the embarassment of being given a warning
by the Commission, and so put pressure on the member state to rectify the situation. The
penalties and ￿nes appear to have been designed as a "stick" of last resort. So, as the
Commission is the arbitor and guardian of the SGP, this essentially gives a supranational
institution say in the ￿scal a⁄airs of member states, although the rules of the SGP dictate
that only a quali￿ed majority vote of the European Council (without the member state
concerned voting), sets in train the penalties associated with the pact17. In this sense the
SGP itself has been criticised as the rules-based part of the pact involves potential future
"sinners" sitting in judgement on whether a member state has or has not "sinned"18.
In terms of the analysis of rules presented earlier, table 3 summarises the discussion
here and the analysis of the SGP.
Rule imposed by Reason for rule Incentive mechanism Enforcement
i) IMF (conditionality) Externalities
Withholding of present
/future funds
None
ii) WTO Free-rider
O⁄setting imposition
of tari⁄s or quotas
None
iii) International agreement
or domestic law (self imposed)
Externalities/
free-rider
Penalties and ￿nes
Judicially
determined
iv) SGP
Coordination/
Externalities/
free-rider
Penalties and ￿nes None
Table 3: Governments and International Rules
25, 2002).
17It is quite ironic that most commentators writing after the SGP had been put in place (for example
Artis and Winkler (1997)) viewed the penalties as unlikely to ever be levied given that the extended nature
of the process in the runup to this decision. Many view the acts of Germany and France in 2003 as an
e⁄ort to avoid the possibility of penalties, given that de￿cits in both these member states are likely to
persist for some time to come.
18Although there are no instances yet of the European Council voting to levy a penalty against a member
state for breach of the SGP, the process has reached the point where such a vote should have taken place,
although because the Council decided to hold the pact "in abeyance" and issue a political declaration
instead, this bridge has yet to be crossed.
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4 The SGP as a Rule
4.1 The Institutional and Legal Shortcomings
The SGP is a very di⁄erent rule from most rules that governments put in place in rela-
tion to the behaviour of the state. Hayek is one of the few economists who has studied
the role of rules and government in our lives from a political economy perspective19. He
outlined the rationale for rules for government in several bodies of work: his view was that
rules should be general enough to ensure proper functioning of the market, in other words
should be restricted to the realm of private property rights and maintaining public order
in a civil society. Hayek said that ￿we can plan a system of general rules which provides
an institutional framework within which the decisions as to what to do...are left to the
individuals￿(Von Hayek (1939), p88). This describes the basic design of the SGP, which
doesn￿ t dictate to member state governments how to run their ￿scal policies, but rather
focuses on the outcome of ￿scal policy in terms of a general limit on ￿scal stimulus. So far
so good. But what about rules that governments impose on themselves for governing their
own behaviour? Hayek would likely say that such rules must be determined by the will of
the people in terms of allowing the greatest latitude in personal liberties.
Following this Hayekian approach, one might ask "was it really the will of the member
states to impose an SGP?". As the member states agreed to the SGP it is, in an inter-
governmental sense, self imposed, so could be thought to be similar to iii) in table 3, but
on the other hand it is monitored and the penalties and ￿nes are decided by the European
Commission and Council, so also appears similar to i) in the same table. This is a major
weakness of the pact referred to earlier ￿it was decided by member state governments
as part of a Treaty that had an excessive de￿cit procedure de￿ned for the purpose of the
creation of EMU, and yet the continuing element of the procedure was put in place as a
directives/a resolution at a later date. As the European Court of Justice noted in its decision
on the workings of the pact in July 2004, the Commission has the right of initiative but
the Council has the right of decision20 . This collectivity of decision-making clearly leads
to problems in terms of application of the SGP given that a quali￿ed majority has to be
reached (with the possibility of reciprocity in voting ￿see Irlenbusch, Leopold-Wildburger,
Schutze, and Sutter (2001)), and if attained, there is no de￿ned collection mechanism if
member states do not comply. This is an awkward con￿guration, in that the "rules of the
19Other notables are John Stuart Mills, Milton Friedman and George Stigler
20The judgement of the European Court of justice last year (of Justice of the European Communities
(2004)) makes this clear.
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game" are uncertain (there is no clear collection mechanism), as well as the "game" itself
(there is no automaticity). So any new proposals, if passed by the Council in the form of a
resolution would be non-binding, and once again, could easily be e⁄ectively ignored21 (see
Crowley (2002c) and De Haan, Berger, and Jan Jansen (2004)).
The second weakness, as noted by many economists, is that the pact consists of a big
"stick" but no "carrots". With other international organizations, the carrot is usually the
release of funds (e.g. the IMF) or the looming threat of some kind of economic reprisals
(e.g. the WTO) and the stick is suspension or expulsion from the organization (e.g. the
British Commonwealth). In contrast, with the punitive parts of the SGP, member states
are given no bene￿ts from ￿scal rectitude, and are only punished for ￿scal excesses.
The third major weakness of the pact is that there appears to be no convincing political-
economy rationale for it. Not only does it interfere with automatic stabilizers (see Farina
and Tamborini (2004) for an assessment of how the SGP may undermine the Maastricht
architecture), but also it acts as an opposing force to the process of democracy. Having
rules that are imposed supra-nationally to potentially limit member state governments in
their obligations and responsibilities in a democratic context seems to ￿ y in the face of ￿scal
sovereignty. Should governments of other member states have the right to limit ￿scal policy
on the basis of the potential for externalities and free-rider problems? Taken to the extreme
this implies that voters in the Netherlands have an ability to sanction and ￿ne and maybe
bene￿t from the French population, because of its choice of government. Put in any other
context, this would sound absurd - and yet it is fully implied by the SGP. The most telling
observation, though, has to do with the interaction of politics and economics surrounding
the SGP. From an economics standpoint, politicians are elected by the populace - their
primary aim is to serve their constituents and their country. The incentive to do so results
in re-election, or promotion within their party/government. There is no incentive for a
politician to obey rules imposed at the EU level as the EU does not elect them, nor does
it promote them for good behavior. If, as stated above, there are doubts about the legal
e¢ cacy of the SGP, there is little incentive to abide by the pact, as even if ￿nes are levied
against a member state, there would be signi￿cant di¢ culties in collecting the ￿nes, given
the level of popularity that the EU enjoys among the European population. Put another
way, politicians have a mandate to enact policies that re￿ ect their election promises, and
21Dutzler and Hable (2005) make the point that in fact the Council didn￿ t ignore the Commissions
recommendations, rather it decided to issue a political declaration. The ECJ made it clear that an
abeyance can result from the inability of the Council to adopt a Commission recommendation, but the
Council itself cannot make new recommendations.
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this is mostly done through ￿scal policy, the right to tax and spend. Restricting the ability
of politicians to do their job is an interference in the democratic process. In this regard,
the SGP would prove extremely unpopular in some quarters if strictly implemented, and
would likely have far-reaching e⁄ects, perhaps endangering further integration in the EU22.
4.2 Economic shortcomings
From an economics perspective, there are several observations that can be made regarding
the SGP and the literature surrounding it. First, most of the commentary and analysis
appears to come from European economists ￿there is very little written by North American
economists. Second, there seems to be an acceptance among most economists writing on
this issue, that some kind of ￿scal pact is necessary ￿most of the discussion in the literature
is indeed based around the form and detail of the pact. Third, that the pact currently
focuses on the variable that correctly gives rise to the rationale for the SGP - the budget
de￿cit.
As outlined above in section 3, rules are necessary to embed social norms or to solve
coordination problems, externalities or free-rider problems. As ￿scal prudence can hardly
be described as a social norm then this reason becomes moot. There is a coordination
problem that needs to be addressed here though, and this is the coordination of ￿scal
and monetary policy with the ECB23. As a representative from the ECB attends the
meetings of the eurozone subgroup of Eco￿n, there is at least some semblance of the usual
releationship that exists between ￿nance ministries and central banks elsewhere in the
world now operational in the eurozone. But this coordination problem would mostly be
addressed by the preventative and surveillance part of the SGP rather than the coercive
part. Of more concern to the ECB is that the ECB continues to purchase member state
debt issue24, and the fear is that without e⁄ective ￿scal restraints on member states, the
ECB may not wish to continue to purchase debt, which could lead to a precipitous decline
in bond prices for heavily indebted member states. These ECB concerns naturally lead
to other conclusions about the SGP from the point of view of the central banker. Clearly
budget de￿cits are not the major concern for the ECB, but rather the level of public debt,
and the size of the member state concerned running the debt. The fact that the SGP was
22This is already proving to be the case, as decisions over the reform of the SGP have been perceived to
have the potential to impact the outcome of the member state referenda on the Constitution.
23Hence the ongoing concerns expressed by the ECB about the "watering down" of the SGP.
24This is one reason why eurozone bond yields have converged to a very narrow spread: di⁄erent central
bank policies for debt purchase have now been supplanted by a single policy under the ECB.
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put in abeyance on November 25th, 2003, due to ￿scal developments in Germany and France
has the ECB particularly concerned, as both these member states are large member states
so the debt purchasing implications are large. The ECB would be much less concerned
about a smaller country breaching the SGP, as there would be little rami￿cations for debt
purchase compared to the ECB￿ s current holdings of public debt. So, ignoring other
problems that the pact might solve, if there is only a coordination problem with the ECB,
then an optimal design for the SGP would allow more exceptions for smaller countries and
give larger member states less weight in any voting system, as larger countries have the
potential to do much more damage to the ECB than smaller countries!
The jury for the case that there are signi￿cant and proven externalities from ￿scal
excesses is still out though. Agell, Calmfors, and Jonsson (1996) originally constructed a
theoretical model which suggests that in￿ ation prone countries making a commitment to
a monetary union with low in￿ ation might lead to a de￿cit bias in those higher in￿ ation
countries. The argument then used by the Commission and others is that this de￿cit
bias will translate into higher interest rates for the rest of the monetary union25. But
if this is the case, then this should be evident in other federations or monetary unions,
in that a higher debt in one sub-state should lead to higher interest rates in other sub-
states. Eichengreen and Wyplosz (1998) found little strong evidence that externalities or
spillovers were a problem in the context of North America, but suggested that there might
be a case here if the member state or collection of member states was large in comparison
to the rest of the EU. Landon and Smith (2000) analyse the Canadian bond market,
looking at externalities from Canadian federal government debt to provincial government
debt, and ￿nd using a standard ordered probit model and credit rating data that there are
signi￿cant spillovers here26. They then go on to analyse inter-provincial externalities.and
￿nd that there are indeed signi￿cant negative externalities for a large province such as
Ontario having a larger debt27, but for other provinces there are insigni￿cant externalities.
Codogno, Favero, and Missale (2003) analyze bond data to evaluate what the e⁄ect of
increased debt to GDP ratios is on interest rate spreads when controlling for international
factors, and ￿nd that with the exception of Austria, Italy and Spain, the e⁄ects are not
signi￿cantly di⁄erent from zero. Also the authors go on to test for a structural break in
25An interesting corrollary of this view is that ￿scal rules might lead to lower interest rates, regardless of
whether there are any spillover e⁄ects. Alt and Lowry (1997) ￿nd that there is evidence in the US context
that de￿cit rules do lower borrowing costs.
26This would be the equivalent of externalities from EU debt to individual member state debt.
27Hence a larger Ontario debt increases the credit rating and lowers the interest rate charged on other
province￿ s bonds.
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the data in 1999 when EMU was initiated, but with the exception of Ireland, no signi￿cant
strucutral break was found.
While there appears to be no ￿rm evidence that externalities pose a problem for the
eurozone, there is perhaps a case to be made for a potential free rider problem, but in
theory the Maastricht "no bailout" clause should take care of this as if the EU does not
proceed to establish a ￿scal union, national debt will still be priced on a member-state by
member-state basis. A casual observer might claim that as European bond yield spreads are
so narrow, perhaps this is due to the SGP, but this narrowing of yield spreads is observed in
other countries such as Canada, where provincial bond yield spreads are also nearly always
narrow, without the Canadian equivalent of an SGP28.
So to sum up, in reality the main cause for concern is with public debt levels, and the
coordination of ￿scal and monetary policy in EMU. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to review the considerable body of work in the economics literature which documents the
views of those economists who consider the shortcomings of the SGP29, so instead table 4
below documents these criticisms with the suggested changes to the pact in the literature.
28The Bank of Canada is permitted to hold provincial bond issues in its portfolio, and there is a line
entry in its balance sheet, but historically it has not held any provincial paper.
29An excellent review of the SGP literature can be found in Treasury (2004)
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5 Where do we go from here?
5.1 The Commission￿ s Review and the Agreed Revisions
After the events of late 2003 and 2004, culminating in the overhaul of the SGP on March
22nd 2005 after the review by the Commission, there is really still no consensus among
academic economists about what to do with the pact. Clearly this lack of consensus is not
a good state of a⁄airs, as it gives no guidance to the policymakers who have to abide by
the pact on a day-to-day basis.
It was clear from Flores, Giudice, and Turrini (2005), Deroose and Langedijk (2005) and
Buti, Eij¢ nger, and Franco (2003), that the Commission was in favor of maintaining the
current general framework, and making incremental changes to improve the implementation
of the pact and the surveillance of member state ￿scal policy. Their reasons were simple:
the pact appears to have maintained some degree of ￿scal austerity after the inception of
EMU. To quote Flores, Giudice, and Turrini (2005):
"In spite of recent di¢ culties, there has been no return to the pro￿ igate budget
policies of the past. The SGP and multilateral surveillance have played a
decisive, albeit sometimes di¢ cult, role in containing the de￿cit levels during
the economic slowdown" (p17)
In some senses making incremental changes to the existing arrangements was not the
best approach though, and for noteworthy reasons. Many economists viewed the Maastricht
Treaty as ￿ awed, and maintained that at some point, if continued, the criteria used for
continuing membership of EMU would run into trouble, even with the existing member
states. This has now happened. Was it better to patch up a ￿ awed pact, or to design
something that is durable and makes economic sense? Second, as Buiter and Grafe (2004)
point out, the new accession states throw an additional spanner into the works, one which
will only provide further evidence for the accession countries that the initial EU members are
in￿ exible to their concerns, and then if maintained, will create a permanent ￿three-speed￿
EU.
Although novel ideas for replacing the SGP have been proposed in the literature, none
of them seems likely to be adopted, so a more realistic series of options for the pact is
considered in the light of the analysis undertaken in section 3 above. These options should
be seen as adding to the largely cosmetic options given by Begg and Schelkle (2004), which
is represented below by option 3. Before proceeding it should be noted though that not
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all economists think that the SGP is in need of major reform (see Gali and Perotti (2003)
for example). Indeed these economists claim that scrapping or reforming the pact would
carry greater costs than insistence on enforcing the SGP as is.
5.2 Options for Real Reform of the SGP
Option 1 Scrap the pact
The pact is scrapped, but the Maastricht convergence criteria are still be maintained as
a means of ensuring a certain degree of economic and monetary convergence for new EMU
members. The no-bailout clause in Maastricht would still remain in force, and ￿nancial
markets would be encouraged to properly price member state public debt according to risk
of default and the degree of ￿scal prudence by allowing as much transparency in public
sector accounting as possible. The ECB would make it clear that it will not automatically
underwrite member state debt, and that debt levels in excess of 60 percent of GDP would
likely be the cuto⁄ point. This suggestion follows is a modi￿ed version of the Canadian
model, and is also partically supported by De Grauwe (2003). Now that EMU has been
successfully launched there is really no need for supranational ￿scal constraints on member
states. This option would likely involve a Treaty amendment, unless the excessive de￿cit
procedure could be "reinterpreted" as only being relevant for the transition period into
EMU for newly joining member states.
Option 2 Member state budget legislation
Rules require appropriate incentives and penalties, and if there are insu¢ cient incen-
tives then the potential penalties must be such that personal reputation and liability is at
stake. Any rule that originates at the EU level is liable to political manipulation, favorable
interpretation, and in any event as established above, is not fully enforceable. Member
states should adopt balanced budget amendments (or speci￿c levels of permitted de￿cit
amendments) which are enforceable by law, while at the same time ￿rainy day￿funds be
permitted for smoothing the business cycle at the member state level (see Inman (1996)).
This is the general means of ensuring ￿scal prudence at the state level in the US (and in
some Canadian provinces) and although states are prone to put fewer funds into ￿rainy
day￿funds than might be considered prudent by some, the laws do provide accountability,
transparency, and some scope for automatic stabilizers to work. From a legal perspective,
any state government auditor that does not balance the books in any given year is per-
sonally liable for any shortfall, so that the incentive to allow a shortfall is usually resisted
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and there is a general understanding that hard decisions sometimes have to be made, so
this often doesn￿ t adversely a⁄ect re-election probabilities. In 3 US states the balanced
budget rules can be over-ridden by a 75 percent vote of the legislature, but this has rarely
been done. This option would clearly have to be enforced at the EU level, in the same way
that the independence of central banks was also enforced, and would likely require a Treaty
amendment, as all EMU member states would be expected to comply. Member states that
did not comply and scrapped their budget laws would automatically be suspended from
EMU. An appendix shows the types of balanced budget legislation currently in operation
in the US. Wyplosz (2005b) also implies that he favours this type of arrangement.
Option 3 Tweak the current arrangements
One of the major criticisms of the SGP is that it leads to pro-cyclical ￿scal policy at the
margin: that is, that as growth falls and tax receipts correspondingly fall, if the member
state is near the 3% de￿cit limit, the SGP forces member states to also reduce expenditures,
which exacerbates the fall in growth and hence reduces budgetary ￿ exibility. To increase
￿ exibility, rainy-day funds have been proposed to allow member states greater leeway in
establishing a greater degree of counter-cyclicality in ￿scal policy. But it has been proposed
that more allowance should also be given for allowing public investment if close to the 3%
de￿cit limit, and an exceptional recession would be de￿ned as 0 percent growth rather
than the current fall of 2 percent. Begg and Schelkle (2004) label this type of option "bad
economics", as it only marginally addresses the major economic failings of the SGP. The
option would not require a Treaty change.
Option 4 Conditional SGP
Given that the SGP is already in place, one option would be to modify the pact so
that it contains better economic rationale. From above it is clear that the main focus in
the pact should be on debt, not on budget de￿cits. Rather than shifting the focus entirely
over to debt without the "soft" elements of the clause in Maastricht dictating that member
states with gross levels of debt converging to 60% of GDP satisfy this constraint, use the
debt criteria as a conditional rule to trigger the excessive de￿cit procedure. Thus, any
member state having a debt level lower than 60% of GDP would not be subject to the
excessive de￿cit procedure and the ￿nes inherent in the SGP, while member states with
debt levels higher than 60% would be subject to the excessive de￿cit procedure with the
usual caveats. In this way, a real rules-based economic rationale for the SGP would apply,
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while most transgressions of the 3% budget de￿cit limit would be monitored but would not
be subject to the excessive de￿cit procedure￿ s sanctions and ￿nes. This option would not
require a Treaty amendment, as this conditionality could be part of the "clari￿cation" of
the excessive de￿cit procedure as part of a new resolution.
Option 5 Fiscal Union
As with the previous policies constraining EU member state governments ( - such as
the ERM of the EMS), commit to using the SGP as a stepping stone to ￿scal union at the
EU level. The proposal would imply giving the European Parliament ￿scal powers, and
would be the last step in the EU integration process. This would make economic sense of
the SGP as a rule to protect the ￿ no bailout￿clause of the Maastricht Treaty, and would
be directly in line with the free-rider explanation for rules, in that at some point the debt
of member states would become common debt for the whole European ￿scal union (even
though, as in the US, some of the debt might still be held at the member state level). This
option would clearly require a Treaty amendment.
Table 5 below summarises these options/scenarios. In the current environment, however,
options 1, 2, and 4 are unlikely to be realized, but given the Commission￿ s review of the
SGP, option 3 seems to o⁄er the best way out of the problem that the SGP has created in
the EU.
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6 Concluding Remarks
To conclude we return to the title of the paper. As of writing, the coercive part of the SGP
is currently not in e⁄ective operation, although with the re-write of the rules regarding
"exceptional" circumstances, it will be back in operation for 2005 budgetary outcomes.
But the future of the SGP needs to be taken seriously from an economics and a political
science perspective, as without a proper rationale and implementation, the SGP will end
up once again being the centre of attention in EMU, as further political wrangling occurs.
In this paper a multi-disciplinary approach was taken to the SGP. The aim of the paper
was to present the rationale for having rules, and then combine this with a political economy
approach to the SGP underpinned by "good" economics that address the issues at hand.
The main rationale for having rules for individuals is to resolve coordination problems,
externalities and free-rider problems. For governments, international rules usually lack teeth
unless there are incentive mechanisms in place, and even then there is little to prevent them
being broken and e⁄ective enforcement mechanisms to collect penalties or ￿nes. The most
e⁄ective rules for governments are self-imposed and enforced by citizens and corporations
rather than being imposed from elsewhere, and penalty mechanisms are usually best decided
by a domestic judicial system rather than other countries.
The analysis of rules in the paper led to the conclusion that the SGP is an unusual rule
in that it is regulated by a supranational institution (the Commission) and yet ￿nes and
penalties are decided by an inter-governmental institution (the European Council). The
latter characteristic of the SGP will likely lead to political decision making problems and
di¢ culties with enforcement. There are also perceived shortcomings with the economic
underpinnings of the pact, as the pact focuses on de￿cits rather than public debt. An
analysis of the economic rationale for the pact showed that while there are some coordination
problems that the SGP addresses, there is little evidence of externalities, and unless the
SGP is a pre-cursor for a ￿scal union, there is also little need for a pact on the basis of a
free-rider problem.
Solving these coordination problems with the ECB is likely the most important aspect
of the SGP, but this can mostly be done through the preventative part of the SGP. Ex-
ternalities indeed could arise if the ECB continued to guarantee to be the "buyer of last
resort" for eurozone member state public debt issue, and in this sense gross public debt is
clearly the variable that the SGP should be focused on. The paper also explained how
larger member states who amass large public debts are more likely to be of concern than
Patrick M. Crowley Page: 29SGP
small member states, and in this sense the voting arrangements on the Council are not
appropriate to address the coordination problem that the SGP is meant to address.
In the last section of the paper a range of options was given for dealing with the current
impasse over the SGP, based on a rules-based analysis and political-economy considerations.
The options were to scrap the pact, to replace the pact with a system of self-enforcement
at the member state level, to make the excessive de￿cit sections of the pact conditional on
the 60% debt limit and lastly to make the SGP into a stepping stone towards a ￿scal union.
All of these options are logically underpinned by both economic and political rationale, and
accord with the need to have rules in this instance, or otherwise. Given the current situation
in the EU, making the excessive de￿cit sections of the pact conditional appears to o⁄er the
best possibility of adoption, as politics will likely necessitate that the pact survives, if not
in substance, then surely in form.
Finally, to answer the question posed by the subtitle for this paper, the answer is both.
The SGP currently contains bad economics, but also these contents were arrived at by "the
politics of least resistance". If the SGP is to contain good economics, then choosing a pact
on the basis of the "politics of least resistance" is simply not an option.
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Appendix
A US State Fiscal Rules
Figure 1: US State Laws regarding budgets (Source: Poterba and Reuben (2001))
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